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On July 15, the Constitutional Court of the German Land of Thuringia will announce
its decision on the fate of Thuringia’s controversial Parity Act, which was passed
by Thuringia’s parliament, the Landtag, in 2019. Like Germany’s first Parity Act
in Brandenburg, it requires that electoral candidate lists put forward for Landtag
elections will have to consist of an equal number of alternating women and men, with
the aim of increasing the share of female lawmakers. Several lawsuits challenging
the constitutionality of parity legislation have been filed, among others by Thuringia’s
far-right AfD caucus. While not all arguments against the parity acts are convincing,
it seems likely that they will be found unconstitutional. Like in other countries,
supporters of parity could in this case resort to campaigning for a constitutional
amendment.
Beyond Brandenburg and Thuringia
The German parity acts are inspired by France, where parity legislation was adopted
in 2000. Like in France, the parity acts in Brandenburg and Thuringia would not
ensure a precisely equal number of women and men in the legislature, due to
Germany’s mixed-member proportional representation electoral system. However,
they might increase the share of women, especially in the ranks of the more
conservative parties, which do not have effective internal gender quotas. Currently,
the share of women in the Länder parliaments is between 22 and 44 percent, and at
31 percent in the Bundestag.
Internationally, gender quotas for parliaments are quite widespread and still growing.
According to the Gender Quotas Database, 57 countries have legislated candidate
quotas, another 25 have a number of reserved seats for women. Parity quotas
requiring the same number of male and female candidates are less common, yet
have been introduced in a number of countries such as Belgium, Costa Rica, or
Senegal. In addition, there are countries with gender quotas slightly below 50
percent, such as Spain’s 40 percent, which could be seen as “parity with a margin
of flexibility”. Especially in Europe, the constitutional validity of gender quotas has
often been contested. Countries such as France and Italy enacted constitutional
amendments after their constitutional courts had initially struck them down. Yet in
other places, like Spain, quotas passed constitutional muster without amendment.
Different Concepts of Representative Democracy
Both supporters and opponents of parity evoke grand principles of democracy.
According to the Green Party caucus in the Landtag of Brandenburg, which
sponsored the original bill, women are still lacking equal democratic participation and
effective influence on state authorities. Following an argument developed by Silke
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Laskowski, they claimed that representative democracy required that the specific
perspectives of female citizens be “mirrored” in parliament. The unequal share
of male and female parliamentarians, they further argued, leads to laws that are
biased against or negligent of the interests of women. This argument is quite distinct
from those of the parity movement in France, many of whose leaders rejected the
notion that women were a community with common interests or political positions,
emphasizing that the duality of women and men cut across all societal divisions.
Opponents emphasize that any member of parliament is a representative of the
entire people, should strive for general welfare and should not be beholden to any
particular interest. This position is shared by the Bavarian Constitutional Court,
which rejected an actio popularis demanding parity legislation in 2018. Such a
unitary, or universalist, understanding of representative democracy, in which no
distinctions between voters or between candidates may be made, also led the
French Constitutional Council to reject the first legislated gender quota in 1982.
Some opponents of parity go so far as to claim that it would create estates-
like structures reminiscent of the Ancien Régime, or that it would violate the
unamendable core of the German Basic Law according to Art. 79 (3). A comparative
perspective should give supporters of such sweeping claims pause: Can it really be
maintained that France or Spain have ceased to be democracies?
Limitations of Constitutional Rights
What both arguments have in common is that they are based less on the
interpretation of concrete constitutional provisions than on politico-legal theories
on the nature of representative democracy. Not too surprising, one might say,
given the predilection of German courts to decide cases on the basis of pretty thick
conceptions of what democracy entails. Parity legislation, however, also affects
specific rights which are contained in the German Basic Law as well as in the
constitutions of Brandenburg and Thuringia.
Foremost it is equal suffrage, that is the equality of voters and candidates, which
parity legislation is assumed to interfere with. But does it really? The Spanish
Constitutional Court found that the Spanish 40 percent quota is not discriminatory
since it refers equally to both genders. Those who claim an infringement of equal
suffrage argue that the chances for candidates of one gender to run for a particular
position on the electoral list that is reserved for someone from the other gender
(and, complementarily, the effect of a vote for that candidate) is reduced to zero.
However, this perspective on an individual spot on the list ignores that there are
other positions for which the situation is reversed – when the nominating process
is seen as a whole, the right to formal equal suffrage therefore does not appear to
be affected. The same is true with respect to the prohibition of direct favorable or
disfavorable treatment on the basis of gender in Art. 3 (3) of the Basic Law.
Another way to construe an equality infringement is the argument that an individual
man who wants to run will have worse chances of being chosen for a promising
position on the list than an individual woman because there are usually more male
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than female candidates and thus more competition. This boils down to a claim of
indirect discrimination against men.
Another important electoral principle touched upon by parity is the freedom to vote
and to stand as candidate, like equal suffrage contained in Basic Law Articles 38 (1)
and 28 (1). The Spanish Constitutional Court could see no violation of the free vote,
arguing that there was no right to be chosen as a party’s candidate. In Germany,
however, it is generally assumed that electoral principles such as the free vote apply
during that process since the process of candidate selection prior to the general
elections has such a huge influence on the actual makeup of the parliament. The
freedom to vote for any candidate and to stand for any position is clearly restricted
by parity, or any quota legislation.
The same is true for the autonomy of political parties, constitutionally protected
by Art. 21 of the Basic Law, which encompasses the right of a party to choose
its candidates freely. The interference with party autonomy is exacerbated by the
claim that small parties and those with fewer women as members are affected more
severely than large and comparatively “female” parties, compromising their electoral
chances.
Substantive Equality as Justification?
How could the limitations of party autonomy, the free vote and, arguably, equal
suffrage be justified? For electoral principles, the Federal Constitutional Court
requires “compelling reasons”. Such reasons could perhaps be found in the central
provision in the argument on parity legislation, Art. 3 (2) of the Basic Law. Art. 12 (3)
of the Constitution of Brandenburg and Art. 2 (2) of the Constitution of Thuringia
have a similar content.
Although there is still considerable opposition to this view, it seems fairly established
that the provision “entitles the legislator to compensate factual disadvantages that
typically affect women by means of favorable provisions”. Regarding the parity acts,
however, it is argued that this notion of substantive equality cannot be applied in
the realm of electoral law, where only formal equality reigns, a position shared by
the Italian Constitutional Court. In contrast, Article 9 (2) of the Spanish Constitution
explicitly mentions participation in political life.
Furthermore, many opponents of parity emphasize that Article 3 (2) of Germany’s
Basic Law could only justify measures aiming at equality of chances, never at
equality of outcome, referred to as “rigid quotas”. It has to be mentioned, however,
that the quota is only rigid because of the closed nature of candidate lists in
Brandenburg and Thuringia. If voters could choose specific candidates from the list,
as they can in some Länder, the quota would not be rigid anymore. In elections with
closed lists, equality of chances and of outcome coincide.
Article 3 (2) could also serve as an answer to one of the most common objections
to parity, the slippery slope argument: If gender is a ground for a quota, why not
other personal characteristics, like age or disability? While German politics does
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indeed have a huge problem regarding its lack of inclusion, for example concerning
persons of color or those from immigrant families, courts could point to the lack of
a comparable provision to Art. 3 (2) to foreclose the ride down the slope without
resorting to questionable arguments on gender being a more important characteristic
than any other.
Beyond those doctrinal debates, the affirmative action approach of Art. 3 (2) of the
Basic Law opens the door to a proportionality analysis, as exemplified by the Swiss
Federal Court. In the proportionality framework, the fate of the parity acts depends
on a balancing of the competing constitutional values and whether there are less
intrusive means to facilitate substantive equality in politics. “Flexible parity” in the
Spanish mold could be considered a less severe alternative. It would also allow
parties to reflect their gendered voter base or their commitment to feminism with a
higher share of women on their lists, as the Green and Left Parties have so far done.
It bears, however, the danger of a “ceiling effect”, that is the quota might be met, but
never exceeded, thus rendering it less effective than full-fledged parity.
The outcome of a balancing will depend on how the deciding court perceives
the disadvantages faced by women in politics. Some have doubted that such
disadvantages exist, arguing that the share of female candidates is actually higher
than the share of female party members, suggesting that it is women’s disinterest
in political activism that keeps their number in parliaments low. Like the claim of
indirect discrimination against men, this view assumes it is the group of politically
active citizens among which the equality of chances should be assessed, not all
citizens. It disregards that it might be the challenges faced by women in politics –
from “mansplaining” through family-unfriendly meeting hours and sexist comments
up to old-boys networks – that keep women from being active in political parties in
the first place. It will be interesting to see whether the almost all male Constitutional
Court of Thuringia and the nearly paritary Constitutional Court of Brandenburg will
view this point differently.
After Rejections in Court – Constitutional
Amendment?
The latter will hold its own hearing on parity on August 20. Only if the two courts
come to different conclusions, the Federal Constitutional Court might have to break
the tie in a procedure according to Art. 100 (3) of the Basic Law. If the prevailing
view among mainstream legal academics is any indication, parity will have a hard
time in the courts. Local news coverage of the argument before the Thuringian court
does suggest that it is rather skeptical.
If parity is indeed struck down, its supporters are left to fight for a constitutional
amendment. This has precedents in other countries and might be preferable from the
perspective of constitutional policy, since parity touches upon fundamental notions
of democratic representation and the workings of elections. However, since the
affected rights are contained in the Basic Law, it would likely not suffice to amend the
Länder constitutions. Gaining the necessary support for parity to amend the Basic
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Law currently seems exceedingly difficult, but German parity proponents could learn
from their French role models how to build a movement that mustered the strength to
achieve constitutional change.
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